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IN THE LABORATORY OF THE STATES:
THE PROGRESS OF GLUCKSBERG'S
INVITATION TO STATES TO ADDRESS
END-OF-LIFE CHOICE
Kathryn L. Tucker*
It has now been ten years since the Supreme Court handed down
Glucksberg and Quill, rulings on laws that forbid "assisted sui-
cide." In that time, normative and legal developments in the fields
of law, medicine, and psychology have changed the landscape of
the discourse on the choice of a mentally competent, terminally ill
individual to choose to self-administer medications to bring about a
peaceful death. Although the Court rejected petitioners' claims that
state laws denying them the ability to end their terminal illnesses
through self-administered medication violated the Constitution, it
left states with the opportunity to experiment with legislation that
would allow terminally ill individuals the choices they had previ-
ously sought through litigation. Oregon's experience with its Death
with Dignity Act, which grants terminally ill, mentally competent
individuals the choice to end their lives through self-administered
medication, has proven that such laws provide comfort not only to
those who, faced with the prospect of a horrible death from a ter-
minal illness, choose to end their lives in a peaceful and dignified
manner, but also to those to ultimately choose not to. Additionally,
Oregon's experience shows that the fears that originally attended
the "assisted suicide" debate are unfounded so long as proper pro-
cedures are in place. Because Oregon's Death with Dignity Act has
proven both useful and harmless, this Article concludes that it is
time for other states to follow Oregon's lead and enact their own
legislation to allow their citizens an alternative to what otherwise
could be a prolonged and painful death from terminal illness.
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INTRODUCTION
Invoking continued debate, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded its 1997
decision in Washington v. Glucksberg with these words: "Throughout the
Nation, Americans are engaged in an earnest and profound debate about the
morality, legality, and practicality of physician-assisted suicide. Our holding
permits this debate to continue, as it should in a democratic society."'
The debate has indeed continued these past ten years, and there have
been two particularly significant developments worthy of close examination.
First, Oregon has been implementing its Death with Dignity Act 2 ("Dignity
Act") since 1997. This law empowers terminally ill, mentally competent
adult Oregonians to control the timing and manner of their deaths, subject to
careful procedures. A fraction of dying patients confront a dying process so
prolonged and marked by such extreme suffering and deterioration that,
even with excellent pain and symptom management, they determine that
hastening impending death is the least-bad alternative. The data show that
passing this law has harmed no one and has benefited both the relatively few
patients in extremis who make use of it, and a great many more who draw
comfort from knowing this option is available.
Second, an important evolution has occurred in the terminology used to
discuss the choice of a mentally competent, terminally ill patient to self-
administer medications to bring about a peaceful death. It is increasingly
recognized that it is inaccurate to consider this choice to be "suicide." The
Dignity Act itself states that such actions "shall not, for any purpose,
constitute suicide, assisted suicide, mercy killing or homicide, under the
1. 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997).
2. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800-995 (2005).
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law."3 The Oregon Department of Human Services, which reports on the
implementation of the Dignity Act, rejects referring to this as "assisted sui-
cide" or "physician assisted suicide."
From a mental health perspective, "suicide" and the choice of a dying
patient to hasten impending death in a peaceful and dignified manner are
starkly different.4 The American Psychological Association has recognized
that "the reasoning on which a terminally ill person (whose judgments are
not impaired by mental disorders) bases a decision to end his or her life is
fundamentally different from the reasoning a clinically depressed person
uses to justify suicide."'
3. Id. § 127.880. Since it is explicit in the law that the death of a patient under the Dignity
Act does not constitute "suicide," there is no basis for a suicide exemption under an insurance policy
which excludes payment of benefits in cases of "suicide."
4. E. James Lieberman, Letter to the Editor, Death with Dignity, PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Aug.
4, 2006, at 29. Lieberman wrote:
The term "assisted suicide" is inaccurate and misleading with respect to the [Dignity Act].
These patients and the typical suicide are opposites:
* The suicidal patient has no terminal illness but wants to die; the [Dignity Act] patient has
a terminal illness and wants to live.
* Typical suicides bring shock and tragedy to families and friends; [Dignity Act] deaths
are peaceful and supported by loved ones.
* Typical suicides are secretive and often impulsive and violent. Death in [the Dignity
Act] is planned; it changes only timing in a minor way, but adds control in a major and
socially approved way.
* Suicide is an expression of despair and futility; [the Dignity Act] is a form of affirmation
and empowerment.
Id.
5. Rhea K. Farberman, Am. Psychological Ass'n, Terminal Illness and Hastened Death
Requests: The Important Role of the Mental Health Professional, 28 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC.
544, 544 (1997), quoted in Brief of Amicus Curiae Coalition of Mental Health Professionals in
Support of Respondents at 17, Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006) (No. 04-623); see also
David M. Smith & David Pollack, A Psychiatric Defense of Aid in Dying, 34 COMMUNITY MENTAL
HEALTH J. 547 (1998).
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Many medical experts' and legal experts7 have also come to recognize
that the term "suicide" or "assisted suicide" is inappropriate when discuss-
ing the choice of a mentally competent, terminally ill patient to seek
medications that he or she could consume to bring about a peaceful and dig-
nified death. The term "assisted suicide" has been replaced with more
accurate and value-neutral terms such as "aid in dying" or "physician-
assisted dying."' The only active opponents of this evolution in terminology
are opponents of the practice who continue to malign the choice for aid in
dying by labeling it "suicide."
It is timely now, ten years after Glucksberg, to assess the lessons learned
from the experience in Oregon, and to consider if the laboratory ought to
and/or can be expanded beyond Oregon, as well as the likelihood that such
6. The American Medical Women's Association's position statement Aid in Dying notes as
follows:
The terms "assisted suicide" and/or "physician assisted suicide" have been used in the past, in-
cluding in an AMWA position statement, to refer to the choice of a mentally competent,
terminally ill patient to self administer medication for the purpose of controlling time and
manner of death, in cases where the patient finds the dying process intolerable. The term "sui-
cide" is increasingly recognized as inaccurate and inappropriate in this context and we reject
that term. We adopt the less emotionally charged, value-neutral, and accurate terms "Aid in
Dying" or "Physician Assisted Dying".
Position Statement, Am. Med. Women's Ass'n, Aid in Dying (Sept. 9, 2007), http://www.amwa-
doc.org (follow "Advocacy" hyperlink; then follow "Position Statements" hyperlink); see also
CHARLES F. McKHANN, A TIME TO DIE: THE PLACE FOR PHYSICIAN ASSISTANCE (1999); Joseph B.
Straton, Physician Assistance with Dying: Refraining the Debate; Restricting Access, 15 TEMP. POL.
& Civ. RTs. L. REV. 475, 475 (2006) (arguing that "the process of permitting people to actively end
their lives before their disease ends their lives" ought to be referred to as "physician assistance with
dying," instead of "physician-assisted suicide"); Principles Regarding Physician-Assisted Suicide,
Resolution DOI, Am. Med. Student Ass'n House of Delegates (March 15, 2008) (on file with author)
[hereinafter AMSA Principles] (replacing the organization's use of the phrase "physician-assisted
suicide" with "aid in dying" and stating that the practice "should not ... constitute suicide, assisted
suicide, mercy killing or homicide"); Position Statement, Am. Acad. of Hospice & Palliative Med.,
Physician-Assisted Death (Feb. 14, 2007), available at http://www.aahpm.org/positions/suicide.html
(rejecting the term physician-assisted suicide as "emotionally charged" and inaccurate).
7. E.g., James E. Dallner & D. Scott Manning, Death with Dignity in Montana, 65 MONT.
L. REV. 309, 314-15 (2004). Dallner and Manning note:
[T]he word "suicide" is well suited to the description of a distraught individual with his whole
life ahead of him, who in a moment of despair, commits a completely senseless and utterly
tragic act. In contrast, "suicide" is not well suited to describe an elderly cancer patient who in
the final days of a horrible and agonizing struggle simply wishes to avoid more needless suf-
fering and indignity. The first individual's act destroys what could be a long and productive
life. The elderly cancer patient does not extinguish the hope of a bright future, but rather
avoids the last uncharacteristically painful and undignified moments of a life already fully
lived .... Use of the word "suicide" . .. arouses the images of tragic loss of life in a situation
where the tragedy may be the continuation of life.
Id.
8. E.g., Kevin B. O'Reilly, Oregon nixes use of term "physician-assisted suicide", AM.
MED. NEWS, Nov. 6, 2006, available at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2006/11/06/
prscl 106.htm ("Oregon's Dept. of Human Services announced ... that it no longer would use the
term 'physician-assisted suicide' to describe terminally ill patients who ask doctors to help them
die."); Policy Statement, Am. Pub. Health Ass'n, Supporting Appropriate Language Used to
Discuss End of Life Choices: Policy No. LB-06-02 (Nov. 8, 2006), available at http://
www.compassionandchoices.org/pdfs/APHA Policy.pdf (urging "that accurate, value-neutral terms
such as 'aid in dying' or 'patient directed dying' be used to describe this choice").
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expansion will occur. Part I of this Article reviews the constitutional land-
scape in the wake of Glucksberg and Vacco v. Quill.9 Part II describes the
Oregon statute, the legal challenges it has survived, and the record of its
implementation. Finally, Part III reviews the support and opposition to aid-
in-dying laws nationwide and concludes that there are substantial prospects
that other states will enact laws similar to Oregon's.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL LANDSCAPE
A. Where Did Glucksberg and Quill Leave Us?
In an effort to establish that competent, dying patients have the right to
openly choose a humane, physician-assisted death, laws prohibiting assisted
suicide in New York and Washington were challenged on federal constitu-
tional grounds in the cases of Vacco v. Quill' and Washington v.
Glucksberg."
In these cases, patients and physicians challenged the assisted suicide
laws to the extent that they prohibited doctors from providing medications
to competent, dying patients that the patients could use to hasten death if
they so chose. 2 Liberty and equality guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the U.S. Constitution formed the basis of the claims.' 3 Two federal
courts of appeals, including the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc, agreed that
statutes preventing patients from exercising this option were unconstitu-
tional. 4 The Supreme Court reversed these decisions, but left the door open
to both future legislative reform and a future successful constitutional
claim.'5
The opinions, both majority and concurring, invited legislative reform.
The majority did so in the passage quoted at the beginning of this Article,
and Justice Souter's concurring opinion stated an explicit preference for
9. 521 U.S. 793 (1997).
10. Id.
11. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
12. It should be noted that in these cases, it was assumed that these laws could reach the
conduct of a physician prescribing medications for this purpose; this is a rather large assumption,
and a compelling argument could be made that such conduct is simply outside the scope of such
statutes. As noted elsewhere in this Article, there is an emerging consensus that it is inaccurate to
refer to the choice of a mentally competent, terminally ill patient to seek to hasten death as "sui-
cide"; thus it can be persuasively argued that a physician prescribing medications for such a patient
does not "assist suicide."
13. These cases have been the subject of extensive commentary. A terms and connectors
search for the Glucksberg cite in the Westlaw "law reviews and journals" database on March 1, 2008
yielded 1625 cites; a similar search with the Quill cite yielded 467 citations.
14. See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd sub
nom Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702; Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 521 U.S. 793.
15. The fact that the door was plainly left ajar by the Glucksberg Court distinguishes the
Glucksberg ruling from Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), and the two decisions ought not
be considered of a kind. But see Brian Hawkins, Note, The Glucksberg Renaissance: Substantive
Due Process since Lawrence v. Texas, 105 MICH. L. REv. 409, 411 (2006) (arguing Gluckberg's
restrictive approach to due process is alive and well).
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legislative action in this area. He wrote that "[t]he Court should ... stay its
hand to allow reasonable legislative consideration,"'' 6 and that "the legisla-
tive process is to be preferred."'7 Similarly, Justice O'Connor's concurrence
demonstrated her concern that state legislatures be given the first opportu-
nity to address the issue: "States are presently undertaking extensive and
serious evaluation of physician-assisted suicide and other related issues....
In such circumstances, the ... challenging task of crafting appropriate pro-
cedures for safeguarding ... liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory'
of the States . . . 8
In the course of these cases' movement through the courts, the subject of
a dying patient's right to choose to hasten impending death by self-
administering medications-prescribed by a physician for this purpose-
stimulated a tremendous amount of public education and debate.' 9 In support
of the patients and physicians in Glucksberg and Quill, many citizens of
Washington and New York shared their stories in an amicus brief to the
Supreme Court, detailing the suffering of loved ones who did not have
access to medications that they could self-administer to hasten death when
their dying process became intolerable. Countless citizens began the
discussion about physician-assisted dying in the wake of the ?ublication of
these stories. Media of many varieties also addressed the issue.
16. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 789 (Souter, J., concurring).
17. Id. at 788.
18. Id. at 737 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (second and third omissions in original) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
19. See J.B. Deisher, Letter to the Editor, Living And Dying-Suffering That Precedes Death
Should Be The Real Enemy, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 20, 1994, at B5; Robert A. Free et al., Op-Ed,
Compassion, Dignity In Dying-Terminal Patients Turn To Family When Living Becomes Unbear-
able, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 12, 1997, at B5; Charlotte B. Hammond, Letter to the Editor, Right To
Die-Support For Assisted Suicide, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 17, 1997, at B5; Peter M. McGough, Letter
to the Editor, Physician-Assisted Suicide-Most Patients Are Unaware of Their Treatment Options,
SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 28, 1994, at B5; Carol M. Ostrom, End-Of-Life Issues Prove Perplexing-
'Right To Die' Raises Legal Questions, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 1, 1994, at All; Carol M. Ostrom,
Physician Survey: Suicide Aid Should Be Legal, SEATTLE TIMES, July 14, 1994, at B 1; Carol M.
Ostrom, State ACLU Proposes Assisted-Suicide Law, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 16, 1994, at B3; Nancy
L. Purcell, Op-Ed, Coming To Terms With How We Treat 'The End Of Life', SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 5,
1996, at B5; Brian Willoughby, Suicide Debate Draws 80, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.), Aug. 9,
1994, at Ai; State's Medical Association Repeats Support For Reform, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver,
Wash.), Sept. 26, 1994, at A5; Study: Terminally Ill Fear Loss of Independence, COLUMBIAN (Van-
couver, Wash.), Apr. 11, 1996, at A12.
20. Brief of Amicus Curiae of Surviving Family Members in Support of Physician-Assisted
Dying, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 722032.
21. DVD: Ethics in America 11: Three Farewells: Medicine & the End of Life (Fred Friendly
Seminars 2007), available at http://www.leamer.org/resources/series207.htm; see also Frontline:
Living Old (PBS television broadcast Nov. 21, 2006), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/livingold (depicting stories of elderly patients and their families struggling to main-
tain dignity as they face age and disease).
1598 [Vol. 106:1593
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B. Aggressive Pain and Symptom Management
In Glucksberg and Quill, several members of the Court suggested that
patients may have a right to aggressive pain management. In a concurring
opinion joined by Justice Breyer, Justice O'Connor stated that "a patient
who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing great pain
has no legal barriers to obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to
alleviate that suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and
hastening death. 22 She further wrote that "[t]here is no dispute that dying
patients ... can obtain palliative care, even when doing so would hasten
their deaths. 23
Thus Justices O'Connor and Breyer answered a question that the parties
had not actually posed, appearing to recognize a constitutional right to ade-
quate pain medication-including the practice of terminal or palliative
sedation. 24 In the years since the decisions issued, the practice has become
steadily incorporated in end-of-life care, and authoritative literature in medi-
cal journals detailing the practice is burgeoning.25 Where patients can expect
22. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736-37 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
23. Id. at 737-38; see also id. at 791 (Breyer, J., concurring) ("[The challenged statutes] do
not prohibit doctors from providing patients with drugs sufficient to control pain despite the risk that
those drugs themselves will kill."). Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter also suggested that they
might support a right to pain medication. Justice Ginsburg supported O'Connor's opinion without
joining it. Id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) ("I concur in the Court's judgments ... substantially
for the reasons stated by Justice O'Connor ... ?'). Justice Stevens's statement that "there are situa-
tions in which an interest in hastening death ... is entitled to constitutional protection" seems to
contemplate aggressive treatment for pain. Id. at 741-42 (Stevens, J., concurring). And Justice
Souter indicated "lesser concern" about the difficulty of assessing a patient's wishes "in cases in-
volving limitations on life incidental to pain medication." Id. at 784 n. 16 (Souter, J., concurring).
The practice of sedating patients with intractable pain into unconsciousness and withholding
food and water until death inevitably ensues is known as terminal or palliative sedation and was
endorsed as an acceptable option, indeed one seen as negating the need for assisted suicide, by the
AMA and other amici in the Quill and Glucksberg cases. See, e.g., Brief of the American Medical
Ass'n et al. in Support of Petitioners at 6, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997) (No. 95-1858), 1996
WL 656281. For some patients this may be an acceptable option; others (and their families) abhor
the option of accepting an induced coma and a lingering demise while family members stand vigil
for the week or ten days it takes for dehydration and starvation to bring about death.
24. Many commentators have observed that courts have recognized the constitutional right to
adequate pain medication. E.g., Robert A. Burt, The Supreme Court Speaks: Not Assisted Suicide
but a Constitutional Right to Palliative Care, 337 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1234 (1997); David Or-
entlicher, The Supreme Court and Terminal Sedation: Rejecting Assisted Suicide, Embracing
Euthanasia, 24 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 947, 951-54 (1997); see also Rob McStay, Terminal Seda-
tion: Palliative Care for Intractable Pain, Post Glucksberg and Quill, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 52-53
(2003).
25. E.g., Nat'l Ethics Comm., Veterans Health Admin., The Ethics of Palliative Sedation as a
Therapy of Last Resort, 23 AM. J. HosPIcE & PALLIATIVE MED. 483, 484 (2007) ("There is broad
professional agreement that palliative sedation is a clinically and ethically appropriate response
when patients who are near death suffer severe, unremitting symptoms."); Zev D. Schuman et al.,
Implementing Institutional Change: An Institutional Case Study of Palliative Sedation, 8 J. PALLIA-
TIVE MED. 666 app. at 672 (2005) ("In the United States, there is legal and professional support for
palliative sedation. The United States Supreme Court (in Vacco v. Quill.. .) recognized the right of
patients to receive palliative sedation if that is what is required to relieve their suffering at the end of
life'") (citation omitted); see also Bernard Lo & Gordon Rubenfeld, Palliative Sedation in Dying
Patients, 294 JAMA 1810 (2005).
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good pain and symptom management, the argument that all that is really26 27
needed is simply better pain and symptom management
26 has little traction.
II. THE OREGON EXPERIENCE: HAS THE LABORATORY
SERVED ITS FUNCTION?
A decade after the Supreme Court's invitation for legislative reform, and
with a decade of experience with Oregon's landmark aid-in-dying law, what
have we learned? Has the laboratory envisioned by the Court served its pur-
pose?
A. Challenges to the Death with Dignity Act
The Dignity Act was passed in 1994 through the initiative process. Im-
plementation was obstructed for several years by a lawsuit arguing that the
law denied the terminally ill equal protection of the laws. The Ninth Circuit
dismissed the case on the grounds that the plaintiffs lacked standing.2s Op-
ponents also made an effort to force a repeal through another ballot initiative
in 1997. That effort failed when sixty percent of Oregon voters rejected the
repeal. 29 The Dignity Act began to be implemented in 1998.
Although the law became fully effective in 1998, opponents of the law
continued to seek to overturn it. One strategy was to seek relief from the
federal government, urging the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA")
to take action against Oregon physicians acting in compliance with the law
on the basis that such activity violated the Controlled Substances Act
("CSA"). ° The DEA initially opined that its agents could revoke the regis-
trations of physicians who assisted in hastening deaths under the Dignity
Act. However, U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno overruled this position,
concluding that the CSA did not reach such conduct.3 Reno stated that
"[lhere is no evidence that Congress, in the CSA, intended to displace the
states as the primary regulators of the medical profession, or to override a
26. For an example of such an argument, see Susan M. Wolf, Pragmatism in the Face of
Death: The Role of Facts in the Assisted Suicide Debate, 82 MINN. L. REv. 1063, 1100 (1998).
27. See Kathryn L. Tucker, The Chicken and the Egg: The Pursuit of Choice for a Human[e]
Hastened-Death as a Catalyst for Improved End-of-Life Care; Improved End-of-Life Care as a
Precondition for Legalization of Assisted Dying, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 355, 356 (2004).
28. Lee v. Oregon, 891 F Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995), vacated, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).
29. David J. Garrow, The Oregon Trail, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1997, at A31; Kim Murphy,
Voters in Oregon Soundly Endorse Assisted Suicide, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 1997, at Al.
30. Timothy Egan, Threat from Washington has Chilling Effect on Oregon Law Allowing
Assisted Suicide, N.Y TIMES, Nov. 19, 1997, atA18.
31. Statement of Attorney General Reno on Oregon's Death with Dignity Act, 98 Op. Att'y
Gen. 259 (1998) ("The Department has conducted a thorough and careful review of the issue ....
We have concluded that adverse action against a physician who has assisted in a suicide in full com-
pliance with the Oregon Act would not be authorized by the CSA.").
1600 [Vol. 106:1593
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state's determination as to what constitutes legitimate medical practice in
the absence of a federal law prohibiting that practice. 32
Opponents then sought, in two successive sessions of Congress, to ex-
pand the scope of the CSA to reach the Dignity Act.33 Both efforts failed in
the face of strong opposition from the medical community, founded on the
concern that the proposed measures would exacerbate physicians' fears re-
garding the use of controlled substances in pain management.34
A change in federal administration and philosophy led to a change in le-
gal interpretation. The Bush Administration's first Attorney General, John
Ashcroft, issued a directive in November 2001 (the "Ashcroft Directive"),
advising that the Department of Justice had concluded that prescribing con-
trolled substances under the Dignity Act violated the CSA.35 The directive
stated that "assisting suicide is not a 'legitimate medical purpose' within the
meaning of' the regulations governing implementation of the CSA, and
therefore "prescribing, dispensing, or administering federally controlled
substances to assist suicide violates the [CSA]. 36 In particular, "[s]uch con-
duct by a physician registered to dispense controlled substances may 'render
his registration ... inconsistent with the public interest' and therefore sub-
ject to possible suspension or revocation under [the CSA]." 37
The Ashcroft Directive was challenged in federal court by the state of
Oregon, an Oregon physician, and a group of terminally ill Oregonians, who
asserted that it violated the CSA, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the
U.S. Constitution. The district court reached only the question of whether
the directive was within the scope of the CSA. The court concluded that it
exceeded the authority granted under the CSA, and a permanent injunction
was entered:
The determination of what constitutes a legitimate medical practice or pur-
pose traditionally has been left to the individual states .... The CSA was
never intended, and the USDOJ and DEA were never authorized, to estab-
lish a national medical practice or act as a national medical board. To allow
an attorney general-an appointed executive whose tenure depends en-
tirely on whatever administration occupies the White House-to determine
32. Id.
33. Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999, H.R. 2260, 106th Cong. (1999); Lethal Drug Abuse
Prevention Act of 1998, H.R. 4006, 105th Cong. (1998).
34. See Marcia Angell, Editorial, Caring for the Dying Congressional Mischief, 341 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1923, 1923 (1999) ("If the bill becomes law, it will almost certainly discourage doc-
tors from prescribing or administering adequate doses of drugs to relieve the symptoms of dying
patients."); David Orentlicher & Arthur Caplan, The Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999: A Serious
Threat to Palliative Care, 283 JAMA 255, 255 (2000) ("[Plrogress in [the area of improved pain
care] may be dealt a severe setback should Congress decide to enact the [PRPA] of 1999 .... [T]he
most likely effect of PRPA would be to discourage physicians nationwide from adequately treating
the suffering of their dying patients.").
35. Dispensing of Controlled Substances to Commit Suicide, Att'y Gen. Order No. 2534-
2001, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,607 (Nov. 9, 2001).
36. Id. at 56,608.
37. Id. (omission in original) (citation omitted).
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the legitimacy of a particular medical practice without a specific congres-
sional grant of such authority would be unprecedented and extraordinary.38
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling with much the same rea-
soning. 9 In January 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, leaving
Oregon's landmark law intact and the door to state experimentation with aid
in dying open.40
B. Implementation and Its Implications
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act demonstrates that aid-in-dying laws
can, and do, work well. The Dignity Act establishes tightly controlled pro-
cedures under which competent, terminally ill adults who are under the care
of an attending physician may obtain a prescription for medication to allow
them to control the time, place, and manner of their own impending death.4'
The attending physician must, among other things, determine that the pa-
tient is mentally competent and an Oregon resident, and confirm thepatint' dignoss ad .42
patient's diagnosis and prognosis. To qualify as "terminally ill," a person
must have "an incurable and irreversible disease that has been medically
confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death
within six months. 43
The attending physician must also inform persons requesting such medi-
cation of their diagnosis and prognosis, the risks and probable results of
taking the medication, and alternatives to taking their own lives, including-
although not limited to-hospice care and pain relief." A consulting physi-
cian must confirm the attending physician's medical opinion. 5
Once a request from a qualifying patient has been properly documented
and witnessed, and all waiting periods have expired,46 the attending physi-
cian may prescribe, but not administer, medication to enable the patient to
end his or her life in a humane and dignified manner. The Dignity Act pro-
tects physicians and pharmacists who act in compliance with its
comprehensive procedures from civil or criminal sanctions and any profes-
sional disciplinary actions based on that conduct.
47
38. Oregon v. Ashcroft, 192 E Supp. 2d 1077, 1092 (D. Or. 2002), aff'd, 368 F.3d 1118 (9th
Cir. 2004), aff'd sub nom. Gonzalez v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006).
39. Ashcroft, 368 F.3d 1118, aff'd sub nom. Gonzalez, 546 U.S. 243.
40. Gonzales, 546 U.S. 243; see Kathryn L. Tucker, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Preserves
Oregon's Landmark Death with Dignity Law, 2 NAT'L ASS'N ELDER L. ATT'YS J. 291 (2006).
41. See OR. REV. STAT. § 127.805 (2005).
42. Id. § 127.815.
43. Id. § 127.800(12).
44. Id. § 127.800(7).
45. Id. §§ 127.800(4), .800(8),.820.
46. Id. §§ 127.840-850. The Dignity Act requires a fifteen day waiting period between the
patient's initial oral request and the writing of the prescription, and a forty-eight hour waiting period
between the patient's written request and the writing of the prescription. Id. § 127.850.
47. Id. § 127.885(1)-(2).
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The Dignity Act requires healthcare providers to file reports with the
state documenting their actions.8 Oregon's experience with aid in dying has
therefore been extensively documented and studied. To date, the Oregon
Public Health Division and Department of Human Services have issued nine
annual reports that present and evaluate the state's experience with the Dig-
nity Act.49 Related reports and articles have also been published in leading
medical journals.5 ° These reports constitute the only source of reliable data
regarding actual experience with legal, regulated physician-assisted dying in
America.
C. The Laboratory Has Served Its Function
In invoking the laboratory of the States, the Court in Glucksberg con-
templated that one courageous state could address this controversial issue,
and other states could watch and learn. This is exactly what has happened in
Oregon.
The experience in Oregon has demonstrated that a carefully drafted law
does not place patients at risk.5 In a report examining the Oregon experi-
ence to assess whether vulnerable populations were put at risk, the
12
researchers concluded that there was no evidence supporting this concern.The Oregon experience has caused even staunch opponents to admit that
48. Id. § 127.865.
49. Or. Dep't of Human Servs., Death with Dignity Act Annual Reports,
http://oregon.gov/dhs/ph/pas/ar-index.shtml (last visited Jan. 19, 2008) [hereinafter Annual Re-
ports].
50. E.g., Margaret P. Battin et al., Legal Physician-Assisted Dying in Oregon and the Nether-
lands: Evidence Concerning the Impact on Patients in "Vulnerable" Groups, 33 J. MED. ETHICS 591
(2007); Andrew I. Batavia, So Far So Good: Observations on the First Year of Oregon's Death With
Dignity Act, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 291 (2000); Arthur E. Chin et al., Legalized Physician-
Assisted Suicide in Oregon-The First Year's Experience, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 577 (1999); David
Orentlicher, The Implementation of Oregon's Death With Dignity Act: Reassuring, But More Data
Are Needed, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 489 (2000) (stating that implementation of Oregon law
has so far been limited to terminally ill patients with a clear, persistent, and voluntary request for
hastened death); Amy D. Sullivan et al., Legalized Physician-Assisted Suicide in Oregon-The Sec-
ond Year, 342 NEw ENG. J. MED. 598 (2000); see also Straton, supra note 6; Timothy E. Quill &
Christine K. Cassel, Professional Organizations'Position Statements on Physician-Assisted Suicide:
A Case for Studied Neutrality, 138 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 208 (2003).
51. Battin et al., supra note 50; see also, Quill & Cassel, supra note 50 (urging that medical
associations adopt a position of neutrality on assisted dying laws); Linda Ganzini et al., Oregon
Physicians' Attitudes About and Experiences With End-of-Life Care Since Passage of the Oregon
Death with Dignity Act, 285 JAMA 2363 (2001) (reviewing Oregon's experience with its Death
With Dignity Act and concluding no harm occurred to vulnerable populations); Melinda A. Lee &
Susan W. Tolle, Oregon's Assisted Suicide Vote: The Silver Lining, 124 ANNALS INTERNAL MED.
267 (1996); Straton, supra note 6.
52. Battin et al., supra note 50, at 591. The American Medical Student Association took note
of the Battin study and findings in reaching its own policy to support aid in dying. AMSA Princi-
ples, supra note 6 ("WHEREAS the Oregon data showed 'no evidence of heightened risk for the
elderly, women, the uninsured ... people with low educational status, the poor, the physically dis-
abled or chronically ill, minors, people with psychiatric illnesses including depression, or racial or
ethnic minorities ....' (quoting Battin, supra)).
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continued opposition to such a law can only be based on personal, moral, or
religious grounds 3
The Oregon reports have shown the dire predictions of those initially
opposed to the Dignity Act to have been unfounded. The data demonstrate
that the option of physician-assisted dying has not been unwillingly forced
upon those who are poor, uneducated, uninsured, or otherwise disadvan-
taged 4 In fact, the studies show just the opposite. For example, the eighth
annual report found that a higher level of education is strongly associated
with the use of physician-assisted dying; those with a baccalaureate degree
or higher were 7.9 times more likely than those without a high school di-
ploma to choose physician-assisted dying." The report found that 100% of
patients opting for physician-assisted dying under the Dignity Act had either
private health insurance, Medicare, or Medicaid, and 92% were enrolled in
hospice care.5 Furthermore, the reports demonstrate that use of physician-
assisted dying is limited. During the first nine years in which physician-
assisted dying was a legal option, only 292 Oregonians chose it. 7 And al-
though there has been a gradual increase in the rate of those opting for
physician-assisted dying, the overall rate remains low: the 38 terminally ill
adults who chose this option in 2005 represented only 12 deaths for every
10,000 Oregonians who died that year. 8 A 2000 survey of Oregon physi-
cians found that they granted 1 in 6 requests for aid in dying, and that only 1
in 10 requests resulted in hastened death. 9 Roughly one-third of those pa-
tients who complete the process of seeking medications under the Dignity
Act do not go on to consume the medications. These individuals derive com-
53. See Daniel E. Lee, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Conservative Critique of Intervention,
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 17.
54. E.g., CTR. FOR DISEASE PREVENTION & EPIDEMIOLOGY, OR. HEALTH Div., DEP'T OF
HUMAN RES., OREGON'S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: THE FIRST YEAR'S EXPERIENCE 7 (1999),
available at http://oregon.gov/dhs/ph/pas/docs/yearl.pdf ("Patients who chose physician-assisted
suicide were not disproportionately poor (as measured by Medicaid status), less educated, lacking in
insurance coverage, or lacking in access to hospice care."); see also Battin et al., supra note 50;
Kant Patel, Euthanasia and Physician-Assisted Suicide Policy in the Netherlands and Oregon: A
Comparative Analysis, 19 J. HEALTH & SOC. POL'Y 37 (2004) (finding no empirical evidence of a
slippery slope in Oregon, but more potential for a slide in the Netherlands).
55. OFFICE OF DISEASE PREVENTION & EPIDEMIOLOGY, OR. DEP'T OF HUMAN SERVS.,
EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT ON OREGON'S DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT 12 (2006), available at
http://oregon.gov/dhs/ph/pas/docs/year8.pdf [hereinafter EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT].
56. Id. at 23.
57. OR. PUB. HEALTH Div., OR. DEP'T OF HUM. SERVS., DEATH WITH DIGNITY ANNUAL
REPORTS: YEAR 9 - 2006 SUMMARY (2007), http://oregon.gov/dhs/ph/pas/docs/year9.pdf [hereinafter
NINTH ANNUAL REPORT]. Some commentators have observed that legal medical interventions that
will bring about death, such as removal of feeding tubes, are reluctantly taken, and have reasoned
from this that if aid in dying were legal it would also be rare. See David Orentlicher & Christopher
M. Callahan, Feeding Tubes, Slippery Slopes, and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 25 J. LEGAL MED.
389 (2004). The Oregon data supports this contention.
58. EIGHTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 55, at 4-5.
59. Linda Ganzini et al., Physicians' Experiences with the Oregon Death with Dignity Act,
342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 557, 557 (2000) (finding that the availability of palliative care led some, but
not all, patients to change their mind about hastened death).
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fort from having the option to control the time of death yet ultimately die of
their disease without exercising that control. 60
Outside observers, after carefully studying implementation of the aid-in-
dying law in Oregon, have concluded that the law poses no risk to patients.
For example, a report prepared for the Vermont legislature, after thoroughly
reviewing the Oregon experience, concluded that "it is quiet [sic] apparent
from credible sources in and out of Oregon that the Death with Dignity Act
has not had an adverse impact on end-of-life care and in all probability has
enhanced the other options" 6' Leading scholars have come to conclusions
such as this: "I worried about people being pressured to do this .... But this
data confims... that the policy in Oregon is working. There is no evidence
of abuse or coercion, or misuse of the policy.
62
Indeed, rather than posing a risk to patients or the medical profession,
the Dignity Act has galvanized significant improvements in the care of the
dying in Oregon. Oregon doctors report that since the passage of the Dignity
Act, efforts have been made to improve their ability to provide adequate
63
end-of-life care. These efforts include improving their knowledge of the
use of pain medications for the terminally ill, improving their ability to rec-
ognize depression and other psychiatric disorders, and more frequently
referring their patients to hospice programs. 64 One survey of Oregon physi-
cians on their efforts to improve end-of-life care since 1994 found that 30%
of respondents increased their number of referrals to hospice care and 76%
60. See Annual Reports, supra note 49; NINTH ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 57 (showing
number of prescription recipients each year compared to number of deaths from use of prescrip-
tions).
61. VT. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, OREGON'S DEATH WITH DIGNITY LAW AND EUTHANASIA IN
THE NETHERLANDS: FACTUAL DISPUTES § 3E (2004), available at http://www.leg.state.vt.us/reports/
05Death/DeathWithDignityReport.htm.
62. William McCall, Assisted-suicide cases down in '04, COLUMBIAN (Vancouver, Wash.),
Mar. 11, 2005, at C2 (quoting Arthur Caplan, director of the Center for Bioethics at the University
of Pennsylvania School of Medicine); see also Straton, supra note 6, at 480-82.
63. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE RON WYDEN, U.S. SEN-
ATE, END-OF-LIFE CARE 17 (2007). According to the report:
Representatives of a hospice-based palliative care provider in Oregon stated that the physicians
they work with are more comfortable discussing end-of-life issues with their patients since the
1997 enactment in Oregon of the Death with Dignity Act, which focused attention in the state
on end-of-life care and the options available to individuals. Representatives of a palliative care
program operated by a health care system we interviewed stated that passage of this act helped
create an environment in Oregon where end-of-life issues are discussed more openly.
Id.
64. See Ganzini et al., supra note 51; see also Lee & Tolle, supra note 51, 268-69; Lawrence
J. Schneiderman, Physician-Assisted Dying 293 JAMA 501, 501 (2005); Quill & Cassel, supra note
50, at 209. Schneiderman notes that
one of the unexpected yet undeniable consequences of Oregon's Death with Dignity Act per-
mitting physician aid-in-dying is that "many important and measurable improvements in end-
of-life care" occurred following the Act's implementation. Rather than becoming the brutal
abattoir for hapless patients that some critics predicted, the state is a leader in providing excel-
lent and compassionate palliative care.
Schneiderman, supra, at 501 (reviewing and quoting PHYSICIAN-AssISTED DYING: THE CASE FOR
PALLIATIVE CARE AND PATIENT CHOICE (Timothy E. Quill & Margaret P. Battin eds., 2004)).
June 2008] 1605
Michigan Law Review
made efforts to increase their knowledge of pain medication. A survey of
hospice nurses and social workers in Oregon reveals that they observed, dur-
ing a period from 1998 to 2003, an increase in physicians' knowledge of
palliative care and willingness both to refer and to care for hospice pa-
tients. 66
In addition to the improvement of end-of-life care, the legal option of
aid in dying has psychological benefits for both the terminally ill and the
healthy. The availability of the option of aid in dying gives the terminally ill
autonomy, control, and choice, which physicians in Oregon have identified
as the overwhelming motivational factor behind the decision to request as-
67
sistance in dying. Healthy Oregonians know that if they ever face a
terminal illness, they will have control and choice over their manner of
death.
The data demonstrate that, far from posing any hazard to patients or the
practice of medicine, making the option of assisted dying available has gal-
vanized improvements in end-of-life care and benefited all terminally ill
Oregonians. A central argument against allowing patients access to aid in
• 68
dying has been that risks would arise if the option were available. Actual
experience demonstrates that these risks do not, in fact, exist. And the lack
of these risks undermines the argument against aid in dying.69 This has led
some major medical organizations to conclude that passage of Oregon-type
aid-in-dying laws is good policy and to adopt policy supporting passage of
such laws.7
65. Ganzini et al., supra note 51, at 2363.
66. Elizabeth R. Goy et al., Oregon Hospice Nurses and Social Workers 'Assessment of Phy-
sician Progress in Palliative Care Over the Past 5 Years, I PALLIATIVE & SUPPORTIVE CARE 215
(2004).
67. Kathy L. Cerminara & Alina Perez, Therapeutic Death: A Look at Oregon's Law, 6
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 503, 512-13 (2000) (acknowledging possible negative effects of legal-
ized aid in dying, but concluding that the data from Oregon in one year justifies an optimistic view);
see also Linda Ganzini et al., Experiences of Oregon Nurses and Social Workers with Hospice Pa-
tients who Requested Assistance with Suicide, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 582 (2002) (reporting that
nurses and social workers rated desire to control circumstances of death as the most important rea-
son for requesting aid in dying); Linda Ganzini et al., Oregon Physicians' Perceptions of Patients
Who Request Assisted Suicide and Their Families, 6 J. PALLIATIVE MED. 381 (2003) (finding physi-
cians receiving requests for lethal medication perceive patients as wanting to control their deaths).
68. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 732 (1997) ("We have recognized ...
the real risk of subtle coercion and undue influence in end-of-life situations.").
69. See Tucker, supra note 27. Other reasons that put to rest the fear that passage of aid-in-
dying laws will put patients at risk have been offered. For example, one commentator studied the
reluctance of patients and providers to withdraw feeding tubes, an option legal in every state. See
Orentlicher & Callahan, supra note 57, at 390. He concluded that the data show that feeding tubes
are overutilized and argues that this demonstrates reluctance to take steps that will precipitate death
and that such reluctance will apply in the context of aid in dying. Id.
70. See, e.g., AMSA Principles, supra note 6 ("The American Medical Student Association[]
supports passage of aid in dying laws that empower mentally competent, terminally ill patients to
hasten what might otherwise be a protracted, undignified, or extremely painful death."); Jay Cohen,
CAPG Supports AB 374: The Compassionate Choices Act, CAPG UPDATE (Cal. Ass'n of Physician
Groups, L.A., Cal.), Mar. 2007, at 9, available at http://www.capg.org/docs/capg-update--
march_2007.pdf (supporting passage of an Oregon-type aid-in-dying law in California); Position
Statement, Am. Med. Women's Ass'n, supra note 6 ("AMWA supports the passage of aid-in-dying
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III. ARE OTHER STATES READY FOR AN ASSISTED DYING LAW?
The arguments against aid in dying are unpersuasive. Once those argu-
ments are dismissed, the question remains: given the successful experience
in Oregon, can and should other states adopt laws permitting aid in dying?
A. Support and Opposition
Since 1991, when Washington voters were the first in the nation to con-
sider the question of legalizing physician-assisted dying, the issue has been
in the public eye. In early 1993, Compassion in Dying, now called Compas-
sion & Choices, was formed as a non-profit public interest organization.
This group provides direct counseling to patients confronting end-of-life
decisionmaking and advocates for improved end-of-life care and expanded
choices for terminally ill patients, including aid in dying. This group has
been operating since 1993, advancing the public dialogue on this subject,
speaking in public forums, and counseling thousands of individuals and
their families in states across the nation.
Though Oregon is the only state yet to have legalized the option of phy-
sician aid in dying, support for the option is widespread nationwide. A poll
released by the Pew Research Center in January 2006 found that 60% of
Americans "believe a person has a moral right to end their life if they are
suffering great pain and have no hope of improvement," an increase of near-
ly 20 percentage points since 1975, and 53% "believe a person has a moral
right to end their life if suffering from an incurable disease."'" A Harris poll
published in January 2002 found that 65% of respondents supported legali-
zation of the right to physician-assisted dying, and 61% favored
implementation of a version of the Dignity Act in their own states.72 Another
group of studies found that between 63% and 90% of people with a terminal
illness supported a right to physician-assisted dying and would like to have
the option available to them.73 In California, surveys in February 2005 and
February 2006 found that 70% of California residents supported the idea
laws which empower mentally competent, terminally ill patients and protect participating physi-
cians, such as ... the Oregon Death with Dignity Act.").
71. News Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the People & the Press, More Americans Discuss-
ing-and Planning-End-of-Life Treatment: Strong Public Support for Right to Die, at 8 (Jan. 5,
2006), available at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/266.pdf.
72. Humphrey Taylor, 2-to-I Majorities Continue to Support Rights to Both Euthanasia and
Doctor-Assisted Suicide, HARRIS POLL, Jan. 9, 2002, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/
index.asp?PID=278.
73. Andrew I. Batavia, The Relevance of Data on Physicians and Disability on the Right to
Assisted Suicide: Can Empirical Studies Resolve the Issue?, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 546, 553
(2000) (citing William Breitbart et al., Interest in Physician-Assisted Suicide Among Ambulatory
HIV-Infected Patients, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 238, 240 (1996), and Brett Tindall et al., Letter to the
Editor, Attitudes to Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide in a Group of Homosexual Men with Advanced
HIV Disease, 6 J. ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 1069, 1069 (1993)).
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that "incurably ill patients have the right to ask for and get life-ending medi-
cation. 74
Support is also strong among physicians. A national survey conducted in
February 2005 found that 57% of the 1088 physicians polled believed it is
ethical for a physician to assist a competent, dying patient to hasten death.75
A 2001 survey published by the Journal of the American Medical Associa-
tion found that 51% of responding physicians in Oregon supported the
76Dignity Act and legalization of physician-assisted dying. A nationwide
survey published in 2001 in the Journal of General Internal Medicine found
that 45% of responding physicians believed that physician-assisted death
should be legal, whereas only 34% expressed views to the contrary.77 Some
medical associations have adopted policies supporting passage of aid-in-
dying laws,7" while others, recognizing the division within the medical
community on the question, have opted to embrace a position of neutrality
on the question of legalizing physician-assisted dying.79 Women's health
advocates also support legalization of aid in dying. For example, the Na-
tional Women's Law Center and the National Women's Health Network
endorsed passage of the aid-in-dying law ("AB 374")'o proposed in Califor-
nia in 2007. The National Women's Law Center drew a connection to the
issue of reproductive rights:
As an organization that supports reproductive rights, the Center is commit-
ted to making sure that the religious beliefs of some individuals or entities
do not impose barriers to health care quality or access. We have seen tre-
mendous opposition to certain care at the end of life from the same forces
that oppose women's right to reproductive health care. Because these two
issues implicate similar interests of privacy, autonomy, bodily integrity,
and respect for the patient's conscience and beliefs, we feel compelled to
support AB 374.... This bill would place California, along with Oregon,
at the forefront of efforts to respect individuals' right to consult with their
74. Mark DiCamillo & Mervin Field, Continued Support for Doctor-Assisted Suicide. Most
Would Want Their Physician to Assist Them If They Were Incurably Ill and Wanted To Die, FIELD
POLL (Field Research Corp., S.F., Cal.), Mar. 15, 2006, at 1, 2, available at http://www.field.com
fieldpollonline/subscribers/RLS2188.pdf.
75. Jewish Theological Seminary, Physician-Assisted Suicide Survey, http://www.jtsa.edu/
x5533.xml (last visited Jan. 19, 2008).
76. Ganzini et al., supra note 51, at 2365 tbl.2.
77. Simon N. Whitney et al., Views of United States Physicians and Members of the Ameri-
can Medical Association House of Delegates on Physician-Assisted Suicide, 16 J. GEN. INTERNAL
MED. 290, 292-93 (2001). An additional nationwide survey, published in the New England Journal
of Medicine in 1998, focused on doctors who practiced in one of the ten medical specialties identi-
fied as likely to encounter dying patients (e.g., cardiology, geriatrics, neurology). Of the responding
physicians, 36% said that, if it were legal to do so, they would be willing to hasten death by medica-
tion, and 24% stated that they would be willing to do so by injection. Diane E. Meier et al., A
National Survey of Physician-Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia in the United States, 338 NEw ENG.
J. MED. 1193, 1199 tbl.6 (1998).
78. See supra note 70.
79. See, e.g., Position Statement, Am. Acad. of Hospice & Palliative Med., supra note 6.
80. California Compassionate Choices Act, Assemb. 374, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2007).
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doctors to make the health care decisions they deem best, and perhaps en-
courage other states to do the same."
One might conclude that, with such strong support for legalizing aid in
dying, other states would be passing laws similar to Oregon's. However,
certain groups remain staunchly opposed. These include the so-called "right
to life" lobby12 and the Catholic Church." In addition, a vocal segment of
the disability rights community has raised arguments in opposition to pas-
sage of such laws, contending that legalization of aid in dying for
competent, terminally ill patients would somehow put persons with disabili-
ties into jeopardy. These arguments have been addressed and shown to be
without foundation by a number of scholars.4
B. The Back Alley: Facing the Reality of Leaving Aid in Dying Unregulated
Although legal only in Oregon, physicians throughout the country report
that they regularly receive requests for assistance in dying. A significant
percentage of primary care physicians and an even larger percentage of on-
cologists in the United States report having been asked for their assistance
in a patient's hastened death; one quarter of them complied.85
81. Memorandum from Judy Waxman, Vice President of Health, Nat'l Women's Law Ctr., to
Members of the Cal. State Assembly (May 15, 2007) (footnotes omitted) (on file with author). A
footnote in the memorandum's text refers readers wishing to obtain more information on the Cen-
ter's Religious Restrictions Project to http://www.nwlc.org/details.cfm?id=252&section=health.
82. That this advocacy community has turned its attention to end-of-life issues was made
abundantly clear in the sensationalized case involving Terri Schiavo, where so-called right to life
groups sought to prevent the patient's wishes from being implemented and to force continued tube
feeding on a woman who had permanently lost all cognitive function and was in a permanent vege-
tative state. For extended discussion of who these groups were and how they are funded, see JON B.
EISENBERG, USING TERRI: THE RELIGIOUS RIGHT'S CONSPIRACY TO TAKE AWAY OUR RIGHTS
(2005), and RELIGIOUS COAL. FOR REPROD. CHOICE, THE MEDICAL RIGHT: REMAKING MEDICINE
IN THEIR IMAGE (2007), available at http://www.rcrc.org/pdf/MedicalRightfullreport.pdf (examin-
ing the concerted effort of the religious right to inject religious values into the practice of medicine).
83. In California, Catholic bishops and their political arm have been at the forefront of oppo-
sition to AB 374. Cardinal Roger Mahony led the attack, charging those who support the bill with
participating in a "culture of death." See Jim Sanders, Cardinal scolds Ntiiez on death aid, SACRA-
MENTO BEE, Apr. 3, 2007, at Al.
84. See, e.g., Battin et al., supra note 50, at 594-95; Alicia Ouellette, Disability and the End
of Life, 85 OR. L. REV. 123 (2006); see also Lois Shepherd, Terri Schiavo: Unsettling The Settled,
37 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 297, 320-26 (2006); Kathryn L. Tucker et al., The Sky is Not Falling: Disabil-
ity and Aid-in-Dying, in END OF LIFE ISSUES AND PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES (Timothy H. Lillie &
James L. Werth eds., 2007).
85. A recent study reports that 18-24% of primary care physicians and 46-57% of oncolo-
gists have been asked for aid in dying. Elizabeth M. Arnold et al., Consideration of Hastening Death
Among Hospice Patients and Their Families, 27 J. PAIN SYMPTOM MGMT. 523 (2004). When pa-
tients must go underground for medical care, the risk of encountering a provider who does not
practice competent, ethical medicine is greatly increased. The most well known "back alley" pro-
vider for patients seeking control over their own death may be Jack Kevorkian, the Michigan
pathologist who assisted patients with chronic and terminal conditions to end their lives, often in the
back of an old Volkswagon van. Kevorkian was ultimately convicted of homicide in the death of
Thomas Youk. After serving part of his prison sentence, Kevorkian was granted parole and released
on June 1, 2007. See Monica Davey, Kevorkian Freed After Years in Prison for Aiding Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, June 2, 2007, at A8.
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When aid in dying occurs outside of Oregon-in covert, underground
practice-complications are more likely to occur. For example, there is a
much higher chance of an extended time until death after consuming lethal
86medications under covert practice. Moreover, the stress and anxiety for the
patient and family is much higher when no physician can legally be involved
to counsel the patient and family and provide the prescription for medica-
tions."
This situation is reminiscent of the era when women could not legally
choose to terminate an unwanted pregnancy and had to resort to the "back
alley," where a rusty hanger could be the implement used to end the preg-
nancy, resulting in countless injuries, deaths, and trauma.s8 Thus, the
question is not whether aid in dying will occur, but whether it will occur in a
regulated and controlled fashion with safeguards and scrutiny or covertly, in
a random, dangerous, and unregulated manner.
C. The California Effort
Efforts to pass laws similar to the Oregon Death with Dignity Act have
been launched in other states, including a recent effort in California. The
California Compassionate Choices Act ("CCCA"), introduced in 2007, was
modeled after Oregon's Death with Dignity Act and would have allowed a
mentally competent, terminally ill patient with a prognosis of three months
or less to obtain a prescription to bring about hastened death. 9 The CCCA,
while modeled after the Oregon law, was more restrictive in certain respects,
as a result of amendments sought and accommodated in the legislative proc-
ess. For example, the CCCA would permit use of the law only when a
patient has up to three months life expectancy,9° rather than six months as
permitted in Oregon.9' In addition, the CCCA explicitly required that the
patient self-administer the medications, whereas in Oregon this is implicit.
92
Thus, the already stringent limitations of the Oregon model were made even
more stringent by California legislators seeking to devise a measure that
addresses public concerns while still providing comfort and relief to dying
patients who find their situation intolerable. Notwithstanding the strong
86. See Helene Starks et al., Family Member Involvement in Hastened Death, 31 DEATH
STUD. 105 (2007).
87. Id. at 112-17.
88. Cf Douglas R. Miller, The Alley Behind First Street, Northeast: Criminal Abortion in the
Nation's Capital, 1872-1973, 11 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1 (2004) (detailing history of crimi-
nal abortion in Washington, D.C., before Roe v. Wade).
89. California Compassionate Choices Act, Assemb. 374, 2007-08 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal.
2007).
90. Id. § 7196(g).
91. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 127.800(12), 127.805 (2005).
92. California Compassionate Choices Act § 7197.7.
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public support for the CCCA93 and the many safeguards and restrictions in
the measure, it did not pass and was not reintroduced in 2008. 94
CONCLUSION
Ten years after Glucksberg, it is timely, prudent, and humane for other
states to enact laws to empower terminally ill, mentally competent adult
citizens to control the timing and manner of their deaths by enabling them to
obtain medications from their physician that could be self-administered to
bring about a peaceful and humane death, subject to careful procedures.
Even with excellent pain and symptom management, a fraction of dying
patients confront a dying process so prolonged and marked by such extreme
suffering and deterioration that they determine that hastening impending
death is the least-bad alternative. Passage of aid-in-dying laws harms no one
and would benefit both the relatively few patients in extremis who would
make use of the option and a great many more who would draw comfort
from knowing this is available should their dying process become intoler-
able.
Any state now considering the issue does so with a decade of data from
the state of Oregon, which firmly puts to rest the concern that a legal option
of aid in dying poses risk to patients or physicians. The question, finally, is
simply this: is a state sufficiently compassionate to allow the choice of aid
in dying to terminally ill, competent patients who are receiving state-of-the-
art end-of-life care but are still suffering?
93. See supra notes 74, 80 and accompanying text.
94. Legislative Counsel of California, AB 374 Assembly Bill-History, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/
pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_0351-0400/ab 374_bill_20080204-history.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2008).
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